that their scheme have some problems. Therefore, they proposed a new one and claimed that their scheme overcome all of these problems. However, We will show that Hu et. al. scheme still hold some problems; it cannot resist to denial of service attack and protect the user anonymity. Hence, we propose ours and demonstrate our scheme conquer these problems.
Moreover, since the operation of password change is not explicitly specified in Chien and Chen's scheme, the scheme additionally involves it for completeness.
Hu et. al. scheme performs as follows.
We will use throughout notations as [ Table 1 ] in this paper. Step R4. S=>U : a smart card containing ID, m, I, M and the public parameters (h( ), p).
Step R5. U enters t into his/her smart card. Note that U's smart card contains ID, m, I, M, t, p and h(), and U does not need to remember t after finishing
Step R5.
Login phase
This phase is invoked whenever U wants to login S.
Step L1. U inserts his/her smart card to the card reader of a terminal, and inputs his/her ID and PW.
Step L2. After checking the validity of the ID and verifying M ⊕ h(t⊕PW) equals the stored m, the smart card generates a random number r u = g a mod p, then computes R = h(I⊕ r u ) and C = I ⊕ M ⊕ R = h(x) ⊕ R.
Step L3. U → S : {C, E R [ r u , ID, Nu]}, where the ID, Nu] encrypted using the secret key R.
Authentication phase
This phase is invoked whenever S receives U's login request.
Step A1. S computes R = C ⊕ h(x), then decrypts the message E R [ r u , ID, Nu].
Step A2. After checking the validity of the ID, S compares the decrypted data Nu with the corresponding Ns. If they are equal, S continues the next step. Otherwise, S gives a synchronization signal to U, and U must send an authentication request message to synchronize Nu with Ns.
Step A3. S computes I = h(ID ⊕ x) and verifies whether the following equation holds, R = h( I ⊕ r u ). If it holds, S accepts the service request and sets Ns = Ns + 1. Otherwise, rejects it.
Step A4. and deliver secret information with server.
Password change phase
This phase is invoked whenever U wants to change his/her password PW with a new one, say PW*.
Step P1. U inserts his/her smart card into the smart card reader of a terminal. He/she submits the password PW and requests to change the password.
Step P2. The smart card verifies whether M ⊕ h(t ⊕PW) equals the stored m. If they are equal, then U can enter PW*; otherwise, it rejects the password change request.
Step P3. U's smart card computes m* = m ⊕ h(t⊕ PW) ⊕ h(t⊕PW*), which yields M ⊕ h(t⊕PW*), and then replaces m with m*.
Since the password change operation is performed only within U's smart card, U doesn't need to inform S.
III. Problems of Hu et. al. scheme
They claimed that their scheme explicitly conquer all of mentioned problems in their paper. But, we have found that theirs also have problems as follows.
The user anonymity
We have seen their scheme to inform ID to the server, and ID disclosed from anyone, since anyone can know the secret key R and decrypt the message [ r u , ID, Nu], and then finally look at ID. So, we wonder if the scheme can keeps the user anonymity, because anyone can compute R = C ⊕ h(x) and know the user's ID. Finally, we will adopt hash-function over ID with a random number t for the problem.
Therefore, the server cannot even know who one requests a service to the server and guarantee the user anonymity.
Denial of service attack
They pointed out that the schemes using time Hence, the message cannot pass Step A2. If the attacker infinitely repeat the behavior like that, the server will also continuously reject this message.
Therefore, the user will not be provided for the service from the server by this attack forever.
IV. Our scheme
In this section, we will propose our scheme that is 스마트카드를 이용한 원격 사용자 인증 구조 39 composed of registration phase, login phase, authentication phase and password changing phase and perform as follows.
Registration phase
This phase is invoked whenever U initially registers or re-registers to S .
Step R1. U chooses a password PW and ID, generates a random number t, then computes h(PW⊕ t) and h(ID⊕t).
Step R2. U=>S: h(ID⊕t), h(PW⊕t).
Step R3. S creates and updates an entry for U in the account database, in accordance whether it is U's Step R4. S=>U: a smart card containing m, i, I, M and the public parameters (h( ), p).
Step R5. U enters t into his/her smart card. Note that U's smart card contains m, i, I, M, t, p and h( ), and U does not need to remember t after finishing
Login phase
Step L2. After checking the validity of the h(ID⊕t) and verifying whether M ⊕ h(PW⊕t) equals the stored m, the smart card generates a random number
Step L3. U → S : {i, C, E R [ r u , I, Nu]}, where
encrypted using the secret key R.
Authentication phase
Step A1. S computes IND = i ⊕ x and obtain I from the database that has the random index IND
Step A2. S computes R = C ⊕ h(ID ⊕ t) = C ⊕ I, then decrypts the message E R [ r u , I, Nu].
Step A3. S compare R in
Step A1 with C ⊕ I in the
Step and deliver secret information with server.
Password change phase
Step P1. U inserts his/her smart card into the smart card reader of a terminal. He/she submits the password  and requests to change the password.
Step P2. The smart card verifies whether  ⊕   ⊕  equals the stored m. If they are equal, then U can enter , otherwise, it rejects the password change request.
Step P3. U's smart card computes   ⊕  ⊕  ⊕   ⊕ , which yields  ⊕   ⊕ , and then replaces m with m*.
Since the password change operation is performed only within U's smart card, U does not need to inform .
V. Security analysis
Strong masquerading server/user attack
In 1999, Kocher et al. [7] stated that all existing smart cards were vulnerable in that the secret keys stored in the smart card could be extracted by monitoring the power consumption. In 2002, Messerges et al. [8] showed that the secrets stored in a smart card may be breached by analyzing the leaked information.
In fact, defending this attack is easy. In order to completely block this attack, we have adopted the way and the secret key R is computed by ID with a random number t and h( ) that is not inform to anyone. h ( ID ⊕ t) as the secret key with the server/user is used to create R from C , and is stored in the server's database and the user's smart card. Therefore, if the server's database has been conquered by the attacker, our scheme is secure from this attack.
Insider attack
Since U registers to S by presenting h ( PW ⊕ t) instead of PW , the insider of S can not directly obtain PW . Furthermore, as t is not revealed to S , the insider of S can not obtain PW by performing an off-line guessing attack on
. Thus, the improved scheme can resist the insider attack [10] .
Denial of service attack
Similarly, We have used only the encrypted counter. If anyone wants to change counter, they have to decrypt the data and input disguised counter.
However, the attacker cannot know the another user's h (ID ⊕t ) . Therefore, We can state that the scheme is secure against this attack but that the legal own user input wrong counter by intent by him/herself.
Restricted replay attack
We employ two counters instead of time stamp to resist the restricted replay attack. So neither the replay of an old login message {i,C,E R [ r u ,ID, Ν ] of U nor the replay of S 's response message E R [ I ⊕r s , r u ⊕N s ] will work, as it will fail in Step A2 and Step A5 due to the counter checking respectively in our scheme.
Password detection
Since the smart card can verify PW using the stored m in Step L2, the wrong password will be quickly detected by the smart card once a wrong password input occurs. That is, our scheme provides timely password verification. Similarly, when the smart card was stolen, unauthorized users cannot change the password of the smart card [11] because the smart card can verify PW using the stored m in
Step P2. So the password change phase of our scheme is secure.
The user anonymity
Our scheme use h (ID ⊕ t) instead of ID .
Therefore, anyone cannot surely know the user's ID which the server cannot even know. In addition, since
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we have adopted ID with h( ) and the random number t, anyone cannot guess the user's ID . And, we advise the server to use a random index of the database for the user. Finally, we have claimed that the scheme completely preserve the user anonymity.
VI. Comparisons
Performance
Our scheme needs two extra XOR and one extra hash-function only for registration phase. The registration phase does not influence any phase.
Hence, our scheme dose not decreases performance than Hu et al. scheme except registration that is invoked only whenever the user want registration to the server.
[ Table 1 ] says that our scheme is the same performance with Hu et al. scheme because of registration phase is invoked only once. 
